I. INTRODUCTION
At five feet and one hundred pounds, Addolfo Davis was newly fourteen when he was arrested for home invasion and double homicide. 1 The crime and his subsequent conviction were a shock to those closest to him. But, to the probation officers who had dealt with him before, it was only a matter of time before something like this happened. 2 Davis was eight years old when his drug-addicted mother lost custody of him. 3 He was sent to live with his elderly grandmother in a one-room, basement apartment. 4 At nine years old, Davis had committed his first rob-1. Linda Paul, Addolfo Davis' Story, WBEZ91.5 (Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.wbez.org/story/news/local/addolfo-davis-story.
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bery. 5 While pumping gas to make some money, he stole a girl's purse in order to buy food. 6 By the time Davis was thirteen years old, he had joined a gang and was selling drugs. 7 At the age of fourteen, Davis was made a ward of the state and removed from his grandmother's custody when it was determined that she could not provide the discipline or stability that he needed. 8 A probation officer, who had been working with Davis, asked that he not be placed in a temporary group home because the officer knew that without the necessary structure and discipline, Davis would run away. 9 The probation officer's prediction came true when Davis ran away almost immediately after being placed in a temporary shelter. 10 Five days later, Davis accompanied some members of his gang to a home where he was told a drug deal would be happening. 11 Tragically, some of the older gang members fatally shot two men.
12 Even though he did not personally shoot anyone that day, Davis was charged and found guilty of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and home invasion. 13 Davis was sentenced to a term of natural life, without the possibility of parole. 14 A. PURPOSE This Note will examine the shift in attitude by the United States Supreme Court in regards to juvenile sentencing and how Illinois should reform its statutory juvenile sentencing scheme with a focus on felony murder. First, it will look at the Supreme Court's analysis of several cases involving juveniles and what each means in regards to sentencing. Then it will briefly discuss how states have applied these new sentencing standards. Additionally, it will look at how Illinois has dealt with juvenile sentencing currently and in the past. Finally, it will suggest a new approach to juvenile sentencing in Illinois and how those changes should be implemented.
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B. IMPORTANCE
Beyond the analysis and justification from the United States Supreme Court for differences in juvenile and adult sentencing, juvenile sentencing can primarily be viewed as a morality issue. The United States is one of only two nations (the other being Somalia) that has not ratified a United Nations convention requiring a minimum age of criminal culpability. 15 Furthermore, the United States is the only country that sentences children to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 16 Even if one ignores the clear directives from the United States Supreme Court on sentencing differences for juveniles and adults, it is striking that this nation stands alone on this issue.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly highlighted the differences between juveniles and adults as justification for sentencing differences.
17 This Note will argue that implementing a new style of juvenile sentencing is especially important in the State of Illinois because Illinois faces unique challenges involving crime and gangs. There are a number of factors that have caused Chicago to continually struggle with high rates of crime, especially homicide. 18 These factors include: poverty, gang activity, political corruption, and struggling public schools. 19 However, there is a general consensus among many criminal theorists that the key to reducing crime is in how we deal with juvenile offenders. 20 Sadly, Addolfo Davis's story is far too common among young criminals. Many of these children find love and acceptance in gangs, which they did not find at home. 21 Like Davis, these kids do not receive consistent discipline or stability. 22 without understanding the consequences, until they are sentenced to pay for those mistakes for the rest of their lives. 23 It seems as though a day does not go by without a news article decrying the rate of homicides in Chicago. 24 This Note will argue that juvenile sentencing changes are especially important in Illinois because of the crime issues this state faces. Since 2000, Illinois has seen higher rates of homicide committed by juveniles ages twelve to seventeen and eighteen to twenty-four than many of the surrounding Midwestern states. 25 For that reason, it is imperative that Illinois lead the way for other states in more effective juvenile sentencing.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of cruel and unusual punishment. 26 The United States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons found that this "guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions."
27 That right is derived from the idea that a punishment should be proportional "to both the offender and the offense."
28 For adult offenders, the Supreme Court has frequently upheld the death penalty, natural life sentence without the possibility of parole, and lengthy, consecutive term-ofyears sentences, as consistent with the Eighth Amendment. However, during the past decade, the Supreme Court has called the constitutionality of these sentences into question in regards to juvenile offenders. 29 
III. RECENT TRENDS IN THE SUPREME COURT
In a series of cases beginning in 2005, the United States Supreme Court has begun to shift the way it addresses juvenile sentencing. The following three cases will set up the basis for this Note's argument.
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See 30 At the age of seventeen, Simmons and two others broke into a woman's home at two in the morning and kidnapped her. 31 The three teenagers put duct tape over the woman's eyes and mouth, bound her hands together, and drove her to a state park. 32 Once there, they walked her to a railroad trestle and threw her off the bridge. 33 Following a jury trial, Simmons was found guilty and given the death penalty. 34 The Court examined whether the death penalty was constitutional in this case by comparing it to similar, previously decided cases and state statutes. 35 First, the Court noted that typical theories of punishment, such as retribution and deterrence, do not apply to juveniles because minors do not respond to punishments in the same way as adults. 36 The Court compared the Roper case to Atkins, a case in which it had decided that the death penalty was unconstitutional for those with mental retardation because those offenders had a diminished personal culpability. 37 Furthermore, the Court noted that a majority of states prohibited the death penalty for juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen.
38 Additionally, at the end of the opinion the Court also pointed out that the United States was the only country that still allowed juvenile offenders to be put to death. 39 Finally, the Court closely analyzed the differences between juvenile and adult offenders. 40 "Because the death penalty is the most severe punishment, the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force." 41 For this reason, courts will carefully examine a wide variety of factors before sentencing a defendant to death. 42 The Supreme Court noted three general differences between juveniles and adults. 43 same level of maturity and responsibility as adults generally do. 44 Second, "juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure." 45 Third, a minor's personality is more fluid, and not as well formed, as an adult's personality. 46 For these reasons, the Supreme Court found that juveniles do not have the proper personal culpability necessary to be given the death penalty.
B. GRAHAM V. FLORIDA
In 2010, the Supreme Court heard another case involving juvenile sentencing, in which it considered whether it was constitutional for a juvenile to be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide crime. 48 Graham was seventeen years old when he was involved in a home invasion while on probation for a previous attempted robbery charge. 49 Graham, along with two other young men, forcibly entered a home by threatening the owner with a pistol. 50 The group ransacked the home and locked the homeowner in a closet. 51 Later that same evening, the group attempted a second robbery that resulted in one of the accomplices being shot. 52 Graham was apprehended after fleeing from police in a vehicle and then, after crashing into a light pole, on foot. 53 He was found guilty of all charges and given the maximum sentence: life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
54
The Supreme Court, while examining the Eighth Amendment, once again stated that in order for a punishment to be constitutional, it must be proportional to the crime and the offender. 55 In this case, the majority of states did allow this level of sentence for a juvenile offender. 56 However, when examined closer, the Court found that these sentences were rarely given. 57 The Supreme Court cited the Roper factors and held "that because juveniles have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most se-
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Id vere punishments." 58 Furthermore, a juvenile offender who has not committed or attempted to commit a homicide was found by the Court to have "twice diminished moral culpability:" diminished by both the age of the offender and the nature of the crime.
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Because juveniles will end up serving longer sentences, life without parole is especially harsh. 60 The Supreme Court examined and rejected a number of theories of punishment as justification for juveniles being given such harsh sentences. 61 These theories included retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and concerns of recidivism, which the Court determined did not give any basis for life without parole sentences. 62 Finally, the Court noted that the sentence prevented any sort of rehabilitation from taking place.
63 Through this analysis, the Court held that natural life sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders were unconstitutional. 64 A state must "give defendants . . . some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."
C. MILLER V. ALABAMA
In the most recent decision, the United States Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders convicted of homicide. 66 The Court ultimately held that, for minors, the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. 67 When Evan Miller was fourteen, he beat a neighbor with a baseball bat after the neighbor woke up to Miller trying to take his wallet. 68 Miller then lit a fire to cover up the evidence and the victim died from the injuries and smoke inhalation. 69 Miller was charged and found guilty of murder in the course of arson, which carried a mandatory punishment of life without the possibility of parole. Id.
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The Supreme Court acknowledged the shift it had implemented in sentencing standards for juveniles starting with Roper and Graham. 71 The Court reiterated the factors that make juveniles different from adults as the basis for why, constitutionally, minors must be sentenced differently than adults.
72 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that it was these differences that diminished the "penological justifications" for doling out extremely harsh sentences to juvenile offenders, even when they are found guilty of horrible crimes. 73 The Court underlined the theme that had pervaded its last two decisions, "youth matters in determining the appropriateness" of a harsh sentence. 74 Finally, the Court turned to the basis for its decision regarding the unconstitutionality of the mandatory sentence. 75 It found that mandatory imposition of the harshest sentence available to juvenile offenders did not allow the judge to take into account any of the differences the Supreme Court determined to be important. 76 The Court held that, in sentencing, a judge must be allowed to consider the mitigating factors that accompany youth or there would be too great a risk that the punishment will be disproportionate to the crime.
D. THE NEXT STEP
It is widely recognized by many legal scholars that the United States Supreme Court is moving rather quickly towards abolishing life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders entirely. 78 There are several parts of the analyses of each case that point to this inevitable shift. First, each case acknowledges that the decisions are directly contrary to our historical understanding of juvenile sentencing. 79 The Court rejects the notion of looking at sentencing "through a historical prism" in favor of the evolving moral and ethical standards of society. 80 This opens up the Court to abolish life without parole sentences for juveniles, even though traditionally it is a widely practiced and accepted sentence. Second, each opinion makes it clear that simply because a majority of state sentencing statutes do not cur- rently agree with the decisions, this will not affect the outcome. 81 This argument goes hand-in-hand with the Court's rejection of historical sentencing standards.
82 Again, the Court has left open the possibility of abolishing the harshest sentence available to juveniles. 83 Finally, the Court repeatedly emphasizes the differences between juveniles and adults as an explanation for why each should be sentenced differently. 84 The continued focus on these differences further bolsters the argument for abolishing life sentences without the possibility of parole for juveniles.
However, the Supreme Court has failed to establish a categorical rule in response to how states should deal with sentencing juveniles. 85 The Court may have been concerned that a categorical rule would further prevent judges from being able to consider any outside factors during sentencing. Or the Court may have thought that the states could better decide the proper sentencing scheme for themselves. Without a categorical rule, states have unevenly applied Miller and Graham. 86 
IV. HOW STATES HAVE APPLIED MILLER/GRAHAM
A. DE-FACTO LIFE SENTENCES
One of the ways states have dealt with sentencing post-Miller is through lengthy, consecutive term-of-years sentences, also known as "defacto" life sentences. 87 There has been considerable controversy surrounding this sentencing scheme and about whether it remains constitutional. 88 The Miller opinion does not discuss the issue, though it has been considered by many state courts. 89 Illinois is one state where consecutive term sentences are allowed and given to juveniles.
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As recently as 2012, the California Supreme Court found that a one hundred ten year sentence for a sixteen-year-old offender was unconstitu- tional under Graham. 91 The court found that the length of the sentence was contrary to the mandate in Graham and did not allow the juvenile any meaningful opportunity for release. 92 However, the court did not find consecutive term sentences categorically unconstitutional.
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These de-facto life sentences are not consistent with the language or analysis found in both Miller and Graham. 94 A prison sentence that will last sixty or more years does not allow courts to show juvenile offenders any clemency. 95 Furthermore, despite the lengthy discussion about the differences between adults and juveniles, de-facto life sentences do not give courts any opportunity to take the differences into account when determining a sentence.
B. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
Following Miller, states were faced with the decision of how to deal with juveniles who had already been sentenced to life imprisonment terms. Iowa Governor Terry Branstad chose to immediately commute the sentences of thirty-eight juveniles currently serving life terms, instead of dealing with sentencing appeals. 97 The defendants are now serving sixty-year terms and will be eligible for parole. 98 Governor Branstad chose to retroactively apply Miller because he stated that he wanted to protect the victims and their families from having to go through another trial and the possibility of a more lenient sentence. 
109
The JLC argued that even if Miller is considered a procedural rule, it is a "watershed rule of criminal procedure," which should be applied retroactively. 110 Additionally, once a punishment has been determined to be cruel and unusual, to continue to impose that sentence on a person is also cruel and unusual.
111 Despite these arguments, the Virginia Supreme Court denied the appeal, and Donte Jones will continue to serve his sentence of life in prison.
C. CONTINUED LIFE IMPRISONMENT
The option of life imprisonment still exists as a potential sentence for juveniles. Miller does not require a complete prohibition from life sentences, only from the sentence being imposed automatically. 113 However, the United States Supreme Court did mandate that the differences between adults and juveniles be taken into consideration during sentencing and that, by considering those differences, a sentence of life imprisonment would be relatively rare. 114 
117 Furthermore, an Illinois Appellate court has held that a twentyyear mandatory firearm enhancement is constitutional.
118 This Note will attempt to clear up some of the confusion left by the Miller decision by laying out a clear path for Illinois judges to follow in deciding how to sentence juvenile homicide offenders.
V. HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS
Illinois has a long history of treating juvenile offenders differently than adult offenders. 119 In 1899, Illinois passed the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, which created a juvenile court and a separate court system that would emphasize rehabilitation. 120 Illinois recognized early on that juveniles were fundamentally different from adults and thus, should be treated differently by the justice system. 121 It was not until 1974 that a federal law was passed to provide funding for separate juvenile justice systems. 122 In 1998, Illinois passed the Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act. 123 The purpose of the provision was to address three main goals within the juvenile justice system: accountability, community safety, and compe- 
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[Vol. 35 tency development. 124 By reducing the stigma attached to juvenile offenders and emphasizing rehabilitation and community relations, Illinois has been a leader in the juvenile justice system.
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For a majority of young offenders in Illinois, juvenile court is where they will be charged.
126 Most young people who are charged with a crime have committed a relatively minor offense. 127 For the most serious offenders, there are a few specific circumstances under which they can be transferred to adult court. 128 First, the prosecutor can request a transfer to adult court, which is subject to approval by a juvenile court judge. 129 Second, there are a number of instances in which a juvenile delinquent is automatically transferred to adult court including, if the juvenile is at least fifteen years old and has been charged with any of the following: "first degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated battery with a firearm where the juvenile personally discharged the firearm, armed robbery committed with a firearm, or aggravated vehicular hijacking committed with a firearm." 130 Finally, a defendant who was at least thirteen at the time of the crime will be automatically transferred to adult court if they are charged with "first degree murder committed during the course of aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, or aggravated kidnap[p]ing." 131 Once a juvenile defendant has been transferred to adult court, they are tried as an adult. 132 If they are convicted, the offender will serve time in a juvenile facility until they reach the age of seventeen. 133 At that point, the offender is transferred to an adult facility to serve the remainder of their sentence. 134 
VI. CURRENT JUVENILE SENTENCING IN ILLINOIS
Clearly, Illinois has consistently recognized the benefits of treating juvenile delinquents differently than adult offenders. However, due to the numerous circumstances in which a juvenile defendant can be transferred to adult court, it is obvious that Illinois still has a ways to go in addressing serious sentencing issues. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
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Eighth Amendment has continuously been used to limit juvenile sentencing throughout the United States. 135 Historically, sentencing has been viewed as needing to be proportional to the crime committed. 136 Due to a juvenile's very nature, the age of a juvenile plays a role in examining that proportionality. 137 In Illinois, juveniles transferred to adult court are generally subject to the same sentencing guidelines as adult offenders. 138 These sentences can take various forms. For example, a juvenile convicted of a Class X felony will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of no less than six years and no more than thirty years. 139 If the juvenile defendant is sentenced to several terms, that sentence can be served either concurrently or consecutively. Consecutive terms are permitted at the discretion of the judge. 140 The court is free to consider the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant to determine whether consecutive terms are necessary to protect the public. 141 In various other circumstances, serving several term-of-years sentences consecutively is mandatory. These circumstances include aggravated sexual assault, a Class X felony in which the defendant inflicted a severe bodily injury, aggravated possession of child pornography, and more.
142
Illinois also continues to sentence juveniles to natural life in prison under various situations. 143 A juvenile convicted of first degree murder can be sentenced to life imprisonment if the court finds that the murder was particularly heinous or brutal, if the victim is a peace officer, or if the victim is under the age of twelve and the murder occurs during the course of aggravated sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, or aggravated kidnapping. 144 There are also several circumstances involving the use of firearms that will automatically lengthen a sentence.
145
A judge may consider various different factors when deciding whether to extend the proscribed sentence for a juvenile. 146 These include, but are not limited to, the defendant's conduct, criminal history, the age and handicap status of the victim, whether the crime was related to gang activity, and whether the punishment will serve to deter others. 147 with the considerations suggested by the United States Supreme Court in Roper, but they do not go far enough. 148 As one can see from the exhaustive circumstances described by the Illinois Compiled Statutes, there are many circumstances remaining that allow for Illinois courts to sentence juveniles to consecutive sentences, lengthy sentences, and, in a few cases, natural life sentences. This is problematic because, not only are the sentences being imposed contrary to the direction laid out by the Supreme Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller, but also it presents a moral and ethical question about how juveniles in this country, and especially in Illinois, are treated by the justice system.
VII. WHERE SHOULD ILLINOIS GO FROM HERE A. WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE
Earlier this year, the Illinois Supreme Court appropriately decided to retroactively apply Miller to juveniles previously given automatic natural life sentences. 149 The court reviewed the case of Addolfo Davis, the young man discussed at the beginning of this Note, who has now been in jail for more than twenty years. 150 The court examined whether the Miller decision imposed a substantive or procedural rule in determining whether it should be applied retroactively. 151 Ultimately, the court held that Miller created a substantive rule and, as such, would be applied retroactively. 152 However, the court further noted that only mandatory life sentences were invalidated and maintained that such sentences could be imposed at the discretion of the trial judge.
B. WHAT ILLINOIS NEEDS TO CHANGE
Statutory Sentencing Changes
The first step in changing how Illinois deals with juvenile sentencing is statutorily. The necessary changes are essentially two-fold: first, eliminate life without parole sentences for juveniles entirely, and second, end mandatory sentencing schemes for juveniles. These changes reflect the shifting attitudes of the Supreme Court and will put Illinois at the forefront of ethical and moral sentencing of juveniles. The direction of the United States Supreme Court away from life without parole sentences for juveniles is obvious. First in Roper, the Supreme Court abolished the death penalty as a sentencing option for juveniles. 154 Then in Graham, the Court held that life sentences for juveniles convicted of non-homicide crimes were unconstitutional. 155 Finally, the Miller decision prohibited mandatory natural life sentences. 156 The Supreme Court has followed a clear path away from life without parole sentences. Following the reasoning laid out by the Court in these three cases, it can easily be seen how the Court would deal with abolishing the sentence entirely.
First, the severity of the punishment should be taken into consideration. Justice Elena Kagan, in Miller, wrote in her opinion that as life without parole is the harshest punishment available, it is difficult to justify its use on juveniles. 157 Currently, a sentence of natural life without parole is the harshest sentence that may be imposed on a juvenile defendant. The Court in addressing all three of the precedential cases has shied away from allowing juveniles to receive what are viewed as the cruelest sentences: death and life in prison. 158 It follows logically that there will come a point in which the Court will move away from the latter punishment entirely for young offenders.
The next step of legal analysis will be to examine the differences between juveniles and adults. 159 These differences include the lack of maturity in juveniles, the increased influence of peer pressure, and the transitory state of the juveniles' personality traits. 160 It is these differences that have led the Court to hold that juveniles have a lessened culpability and are therefore, "less deserving of the most severe punishments." 161 In fact, the Supreme Court has "held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for children." 162 As established above, life without parole is the last remaining severe punishment for juveniles. 163 Furthermore, the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. 164 If it is to be believed that juveniles are so different from adults that they cannot be held to the same responsibility for their crimes, it would follow that a sentence that puts a juvenile in prison for the rest of his or her natural life is cruel and unusual, because the juvenile does not possess the requisite culpability. The third part of the analysis is to examine how the punishment of life imprisonment fits within the accepted theories of punishment. The basis for these theories goes hand in hand with the already mentioned differences between juveniles and adults. 165 First, deterrence is not an appropriate justification for the sentence because, as juveniles do not possess the proper risk assessment skills, they are not deterred by threat of punishment. 166 Second, the United States Supreme Court noted that the basis for retribution rationale is the amount of blame placed upon the defendant. 167 Again, as we have determined juveniles to have a diminished culpability, retribution is not an adequate justification for such a lengthy sentence. 168 Finally, rehabilitation is not served by these sentences, as the defendant does not have the opportunity of release. 169 Life imprisonment for juveniles goes directly against the analysis in Graham that led the Supreme Court to state that nonhomicide offenders must be given reasonable and meaningful opportunity for release. 170 Without any reasonable hope that he or she may one day be set free, there is no incentive for the juvenile to reflect and take responsibility for his or her actions, thus destroying any hope for rehabilitation. 171 Following this analysis, it is clear that by the guidelines set by the United States Supreme Court both life without parole sentences and lengthy term of years sentences should be considered unconstitutional. 172 Finally, the attitudes of the community should be considered. In Roper, the Court was especially concerned that a majority of states had already rejected the death penalty for juvenile defendants. 173 Graham noted that community consensus is not "determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual."
174 Most states still impose life without parole on juve-
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nile defendants in certain circumstances. However, the United States is the only country to do so, as noted earlier in this Note.
175
This analysis supports the view that the Supreme Court will continue to trend away from the use of life without parole sentences, until they are abolished entirely. The second step Illinois should take in addressing juvenile sentencing is to do away with mandatory sentencing schemes for juvenile defendants. This will best be accomplished by implementing individualized sentencing hearings in which the judge is required to consider several factors. The Court in Miller stated clearly that, like with death penalty sentences, a life imprisonment sentence for juveniles requires an individualized sentencing hearing. 176 Though Miller only considered life without parole sentences, the logical next step in the legal analysis will be to require these hearings for juvenile offenders who have been convicted and could face lengthy prison sentences. 
Individualized Sentencing
By requiring the trial court to "take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison," the Supreme Court signaled that how trial courts sentence juvenile offenders should begin to change. 178 As Miller already mandates sentencing hearings before convicting a juvenile offender to life without parole, Illinois should change its approach to juvenile sentencing by also requiring individualized sentencing hearings for young criminals facing a lengthy term in prison. 179 Though the United States Supreme Court has not yet explicitly stated that lengthy term of years sentences require such hearings, several arguments can be made in support of mandating them.
For example, if a fifteen year old is convicted of murder in Illinois, he or she may be sentenced to sixty years imprisonment. 180 On release, he or she could be seventy-five years old. However, according to a study done in Michigan, it is unlikely that this juvenile offender will actually live to that age. While the life expectancy for someone born today is about seventyseven years old, it is significantly lower for those who are incarcerated in their youth. 181 The average life expectancy for a prison inmate is about fif- 183 This is a shockingly low life expectancy for juvenile offenders. By these numbers, any term longer than thirty-five years, for a non-homicide offender, does not provide the juvenile with a meaningful opportunity for release as required by Graham.
184
Similar analysis, as used earlier in this Note to show how the Supreme Court is moving away from life without parole sentences for juveniles, can be used to argue that individualized sentencing hearings should be required before sentencing juvenile offenders to lengthy prison sentences. The differences between juveniles and adults have been discussed throughout this Note but they bear repeating. Juveniles lack maturity and rational decisionmaking abilities. 185 Juveniles are more susceptible to peer pressure and other negative influences. 186 Finally, a young person's personality is still being formed. 187 The Supreme Court has taken these differences to mean that the conduct of a juvenile offender is not to be considered as "morally reprehensible as that of an adult."
188 By repeatedly highlighting these differences and stating that juveniles and adults should be judged by different standards, it logically follows that juvenile sentencing should be handled differently, even beyond that which has already been required by the United States Supreme Court. In the Miller decision, Justice Kagan discussed the limitations caused by mandatory sentencing schemes, in respect to life without parole sentences, as preventing the trial court from taking into consideration the character of the offense and the individual offenders, as well as any other possibly mitigating factors. 189 This consequence of a mandatory sentence is the reason for a required, post-conviction sentencing hearing before a juvenile can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 190 A repeated critique of the extension of Graham and Miller is that the decisions are inconsistent. 191 In Graham, the majority extensively describes the differences between juveniles and adults as justification for sentencing the two classes of offenders differently. 192 The majority in Miller follows the same analysis, but stops short of creating a hardline rule, stating that in some cases life without parole would be an appropriate sentence for a juvenile offender. 193 The criticism is that if juveniles and adults are so fundamentally different, why do those differences not matter as much when the juvenile is charged with homicide? 194 This Note argues that just because Miller does not explicitly preclude life without parole sentences that does not diminish the change in attitudes about juvenile sentencing by the United States Supreme Court.
As previously discussed, the life expectancy for an inmate who was sentenced to prison as a juvenile is only fifty years old. 195 With a low life expectancy, it is conceivable that many juvenile offenders sentenced to lengthy prison terms will die in prison. For this reason, it is just as important for juveniles who receive a lengthy term of years sentence to have an individualized sentencing hearing as it is for a juvenile who faces a life sentence. Looking at the statistics, the only difference between a life sentence and a lengthy term is the first guarantees the offender will die in prison, while the second makes it a statistical probability. [Vol. 35 greed, holding that the juvenile court must consider the evidence as opposed to transferring based on the nature of the crime alone.
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Illinois should take a cue from the Texas court and require that a trial court consider multiple factors before sentencing a juvenile homicide offender. Currently, Illinois statutes allow a trial court to consider several factors before imposing a more severe sentence on a convicted defendant.
204
The trial court may also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant in deciding whether the defendant should serve multiple sentences consecutively. 205 There are many opportunities for the trial court to use its discretion to lengthen a juvenile's time in prison. 206 However, there are no similar standards in place that require trial courts to consider any of the mitigating factors, discussed at length by the United States Supreme Court, before sentencing a juvenile offender. Standards for post-conviction, individualized sentencing hearings for juvenile offenders should be established in Illinois because juveniles are fundamentally different from adults 207 and, as such, should be subject to different, more rigorous, sentencing standards.
208
The reoccurring argument against requiring individualized sentencing hearings for juveniles, both for life and lengthy term sentences, comes out of Harmelin v. Michigan. 209 In Harmelin, the Supreme Court considered a life sentence for an adult offender convicted of possession of cocaine. 210 The Court held that "a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual [does not] become[] so simply because it is 'mandatory.'" 211 However, Harmelin dealt with an adult offender 212 and it is reasonable for a trial court to treat adult and juvenile offenders differently based on inherent differences. 213 Additionally, juvenile offenders should be sentenced differently than adult offenders because Illinois law makers may not have had juveniles in mind when writing the sentencing statutes. 214 Juvenile offenders in Illinois are transferred to adult court under a number of circumstances, either presumptively or through the discretion of the juvenile court. 215 Once transferred, the juvenile offenders are subject to the same sentencing scheme as the adult offenders. 216 In essence, despite repeated discussion by the Supreme Court about the fundamental characteristics of juveniles, which lessen their culpability, those characteristics have never been considered prior to sentencing juvenile offenders.
Based on these assertions, it is clear that in order to properly follow the legal analysis of Miller, 217 Illinois should adopt a new rule requiring trial courts to consider the characteristics of the juvenile before sentencing him or her, for both possible life without parole and lengthy term sentences. This new rule should go beyond allowing trial courts to have discretion when deciding the length of a juvenile's sentence. For guidance, lawmakers should look to a recent case out of Ohio.
218 Eric Long was seventeen years old when he was involved in several crimes stemming from two shootings in March of 2009. 219 Following his conviction, at a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to two consecutive life terms. 220 Long appealed, arguing that the hearing needed to be more than discretionary, the judge should have considered the Miller factors. 221 The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed and ruled that the trial court must consider mitigating factors during a sentencing hearing.
222
Like Ohio, Illinois should require sentencing hearings that allow the judge discretion and necessitate the consideration of factors related to the offender's special circumstances as a juvenile. 223 would be ideal for Illinois to adopt. 225 The factors the Wyoming Court used were pulled from Miller and organized into a clear list. 226 During a postconviction sentencing hearing, a trial court should scrutinize the following factors before sentencing a juvenile offender: (a) the character and history of the juvenile offender and the specific circumstances of the crime; (b) the background and emotional and mental development of the juvenile offender; (c) the offender's age and characteristics that go along with it including immaturity and ability to appreciate risks; (d) the juvenile's family and home environment; (e) the circumstances of the crime, the extent to which the juvenile was involved, and the extent to which peer or familial pressure may have factored into the juvenile's participation; (f) "the juvenile's relative inability to deal with police and prosecutors or to assist his own attorney"; and (g) the offender's potential for rehabilitation. 227 The trial court should be required to enumerate these factors on the record in order to ensure that each one has been properly scrutinized and applied to the specific circumstances.
The trial court should examine these factors at the time of sentencing, not at a parole hearing after the juvenile has served a portion of their sentence. 228 If Illinois were to wait until a parole hearing to consider the proposed factors it would be too late. 229 For example, if all juvenile offenders convicted of felony murder in Illinois were given extended prison sentences without the appropriate scrutiny at sentencing, but would receive a parole hearing after serving a portion of their sentence which would take into account all of diminishing factors, it would not be enough. 230 This would be "[i]mposing a one-size-fits-all approach to juvenile sentencing" that is directly contrary to the concerns the Supreme Court has with giving juvenile offenders the harshest possible sentences. 231 In order to be in compliance with Miller, Illinois must require that the trial court consider all of the mitigating factors prior to sentencing.
232
Of course there will be instances in which it is necessary to sentence the juvenile offender to an extended prison sentence or, until it is abolished, a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. 233 The Supreme Court in Miller signals that it is not yet prepared to completely "foreclose a sentencer's ability" to sentence a juvenile offender to life in prison. 234 Likewise, trial courts in Illinois should still be allowed to issue lengthy term sentences in the appropriate circumstances.
235 However, such a harsh punishment should not be common given the many mitigating factors associated with youth.
236
In order for an Illinois trial court to sentence a juvenile offender to life without parole or to a lengthy term, the judge should be required to conclude on the record that several factors apply to the situation. 237 These factors are:
[ nal sophistication, and other factors dictate a finding that the child cannot be rehabilitated.
238
The harshest punishments should appropriate only when all of the previous factors have been met. 239 In doing so, it ensures that the sentence is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Miller that such punishments are uncommon. 
Meaningful Opportunity for Release
Unless the trial court determines that it is necessary to sentence the juvenile offender to a lengthy prison term or life without parole, the juvenile must be given a meaningful opportunity for release, consistent with Graham. 241 The Graham decision stated that the opportunity for release must be "based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." 242 The Supreme Court, however, leaves it up to the states to determine what compliance with this mandate should require.
243
For Illinois, compliance with a meaningful opportunity for release should include early parole hearings that review the benefits and disadvantages of continued incarceration. 244 It is important for the parole hearings to commence before the juvenile offender reaches old age 245 because, for many criminals who begin a pattern of crime at a young age, these offenders are likely to outgrow their antisocial behavior as they age and mature. 246 Based on this sharp drop off in criminal activity, the parole board should look closely at the juvenile offender's current age, maturity, and behavior.
247 Though it is difficult to accurately determine which juvenile offenders will continue to act in an antisocial manner, one of the greatest indicators of future criminal activity is a substance abuse disorder. 248 Furthermore, family involvement in the treatment of the substance abuse disorder has been shown to have the longest lasting effects. 249 Therefore, the parole board should also carefully consider the level of family support available to the juvenile and whether any substance abuse issues are apparent. 250 Additionally, it is important for the parole board to note the access the juvenile offender had to rehabilitative services and vocational training. 251 The Graham Court stressed the importance of rehabilitation, especially in relation to juvenile inmates. 252 The parole board must be used to ensure that juvenile offenders are being given the proper opportunities to assist them in rehabilitation and possible training to make potential future release more successful. 253 Finally, it is very important for the parole board to focus on the juvenile offender's age and relative lack of maturity at the time of the offense, as opposed to the seriousness of the crime. 254 The Supreme Court in Roper advised that it was likely "that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower the mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course." 255 Therefore, while it is important for the parole board to consider the punitive and incapacitation natures of the punishment, that should not be the main focus of their review.
VIII. CONCLUSION
On December 1, 2014, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari on Addolfo Davis's case. 256 In doing so, it al-
